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The current crisis raises the question whether loans to SMEs in emerging markets are 
inherently more risky. We use a unique unbalanced panel of nearly 700 loans made to 
SMEs in Slovakia between 2000 and 2005. Several probit and panel probit models show 
that liquidity and profitability factors are important determinants of SME defaults. 
Moreover, we find that indebtedness significantly increases the probability of default. 
Finally, liability as proxied by the legal form of SMEs has important incentive effects. 
In sum, default rates and factors converged to values found in developed financial 
markets.  
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The current financial crisis has hit Eastern Europe particularly severe (IMF, 2009). This 
implies that banks expect running big losses in their credit business in the near future. 
Since the banking sectors in Eastern Europe are dominated by foreign banks from 
Western Europe, their parent banks will have to bear these losses. There are several 
reasons why the default rate of loans will rise. First, firms in these open economies are 
negatively affected by the global economic downturn. Second, in some countries many 
loans are denominated in foreign currency, which renders their repayment less likely if 
the local currency devaluates. Apart from these two factors that increase credit risk, the 
question arises whether loans in emerging markets are inherently more risky? 
There are some papers about default rates of SMEs mainly in developed countries 
(Jacobson et al., 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2007).
1 The evidence of the default 
pattern of loans to individual firms in emerging markets in general and the new EU 
member states in particular is still missing. In this paper, we study the default rates on 
loans to SMEs in Slovakia. In addition, we address the following questions: Is there a 
common pattern in the financial indicators and the business development of defaulters? 
What is the role of the incentives related to the liability requirements for different legal 
forms of the SMEs? 
We analyze these issues by using a unique set of data about loans made to around 
700 SMEs in Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005. This period of time is 
particularly well suited to address the question of credit risk because the rate of loan 
growth was rather moderate. The default rate among loans made to SMEs was relatively 
moderate at 6.0 per cent. The default rates clearly differ between industries; they are 
highly above average in the service sector and in agriculture. Moreover, the default rates 
are much lower for natural persons than for legal bodies. We also provide evidence that 
lower profitability and lower liquidity increase the risk of default. Furthermore, we 
show that indebtedness increases the risk of default only for highly indebted firms. 
These results suggest that incentive effects determine the probability of default. 
                                                 
1 For emerging markets, there are some papers about other segments of the credit market, for example, 
Lin and Yan (2003) on home mortgages and Kočenda and Vojtek (2006 and 2009). 
2 The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a survey of the 
literature on loan defaults and derives the predictions to be tested empirically. Section 3 
describes our data set, and Section 4 analyzes factors determining the probability of 
default in probit models including sensitivity analysis, which tries to address possible 
selection bias and endogeneity problems. Section 5 looks at the pattern of sectoral end 
legal form effects from the perspective of incentive structure. The last section 
concludes.  
2.  Determinants of Default Rates and Literature Review  
The determinants of corporate defaults in developed financial markets are discussed 
intensively in the literature. Loan default is closely related to corporate bankruptcy 
(Lízal, 2002). The causes of bankruptcy are problems in the fields of indebtedness, 
profitability, liquidity and solvency (Altman, 1968). Firms are more likely to default if 
they are highly indebted, less profitable, less liquid, and if the legal system does not 
create efficient incentives to repay the loans. Selected financial ratios related to these 
factors are commonly used to predict the probability of corporate bankruptcy in 
developed financial markets (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966), but less evidence is 
available for the new member states. 
Our first hypothesis is related to the literature on default rates and the problems of 
asymmetric information. Problems of asymmetric information play an important role in 
financing SMEs. The adverse selection and ex ante moral hazard should be more severe 
in the new member states of the EU. According to the so-called “observed-risk 
hypothesis”, banks can observe the firm’s risk ex ante and can adjust the terms of the 
credit contract accordingly so as to adjust pricing to the riskiness of the loan (Blazy and 
Weill, 2006).  
Highly indebted firms have to pay a high proportion of their payoff to the bank if 
they are successful. As a result, ceteris paribus, the difference between the payoffs for 
success and failure decreases. This reduces the incentives to exert effort in order to 
increase the success of the project. Moreover, this introduces incentives to make riskier 
investments than originally agreed upon in the credit contract. This moral hazard 
behavior decreases the probability of success. Therefore, we expect that indebted firms 
are more likely to default (hypothesis 1). Low profitability and liquidity are also 
generally seen as important default determinants (hypothesis 2). On the one hand, low 
3 profits may mean that the investment was not successful. On the other hand, low 
liquidity can cause financial bottlenecks, which may also cause defaults.  
In addition, there are other characteristics of the firm, which influence the degree of 
the moral hazard problems and ultimately the risk of default. If the debtor is fully liable, 
the effects of investment decisions are internalized in the payoffs. In contrast, when the 
degree of debtor’s liability is restricted, for example, if there are insufficient assets that 
can be used as collateral and can be liquidated in the case of failure, the debtor repays 
only in the case of a successful outcome. As a consequence, the incentives of the debtor 
are distorted if he is not (fully) liable (see Bester, 1987, Holmström, 1996, and Hainz, 
2003).
 2  
A similar argument applies to strategic default. Suppose that the creditor cannot 
observe the actual outcome of a project. This allows the debtor to claim that his project 
has failed (although it was successful) and to keep the return. If the debtor is liable and 
loses assets in the case of failure, the likelihood of strategic default is much lower (see 
Bester, 1994). The debtor’s liability is largely determined by the legal form. On the one 
hand, natural persons are fully liable for their losses. On the other hand, owners can 
limit their liability more easily by incorporating the firm as a legal body with a limited 
liability. The higher the debtor’s liability, ceteris paribus, the less likely the firm is to 
default (hypothesis 3). 
3.  Data Description  
Profit oriented commercial banking was introduced in Slovakia, as well as in other 
transition countries, only at the beginning of the 1990s. The first year of economic 
transition were characterized by an underdeveloped financial sector especially with 
respect to SMEs. In the early reform years, Lízal and Švejnar (2001) find evidence of a 
soft budget constraint mainly for the former state enterprises in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Access to finance remained difficult as shown by EBRD (2005a) reporting 
that it was one of the most important business constraints on small private firms. During 
the 1990s, from the point of view of banks, bad loans and credit defaults represented a 
                                                 
2 According to EBRD (2005b), an overwhelming majority (92 per cent) of loans to SMEs in Slovakia had 
to pledge collateral that was a high 150 per cent of the loan value. Nevertheless, the recovery rates of 
loans may be very different in individual cases.  
4 major problem (see Tkáčová, 2001). Only in the last few years has the total volume of 
loans started to grow strongly. 
We have a unique data set on SMEs in Slovakia between 2000 and 2005. Our data 
set is from a major commercial bank in Slovakia that provided all types of loans in all 
regions of the country. In the bank’s strategy, lending to SMEs was viewed as core 
business whose importance should further increase. Similarly to other banks in the 
region, the bank was privatized to a large Western European banking group at the 
beginning of the period analyzed here.
3 As a result, our analysis is likely to be 
applicable to other countries of the enlarged EU, although we cannot present direct 
comparisons.  
The anonymous data set is used for an ex post evaluation of the credit risk of various 
types of the SMEs. Our data set consists of two parts. First, we have information on 
whether a SME defaulted on its loan during five partially overlapping periods of 18 
months, which start in January (e.g. the first period being January 2000 to June 2001, 
the last period being January 2004 to June 2005). Default companies are dropped from 
the sample after the period in which insolvency occurred. In order to preserve a 
consistency between the time periods, clients who repaid their loans before the end of 
the period analyzed were not included in the sample.
4 The data set includes only SMEs 
with double-entry bookkeeping in order to ensure a reliable data base. The original data 
set was checked on consistency before estimations.  
This information set on defaults is merged with selected financial data from the 
firms’ annual balance sheets published in December of the respective year before the 
reported period (e.g. December 1999 is used for the explanation of defaults between 
January 2000 and June 2001).
5 All items are reported as shares in total assets or 
liabilities. Total sales indicate the size of the SMEs, and they are also used for the 
definition of the SMEs as being between SKK 30 million (approximately EUR 1 
                                                 
3 We also used a shorter period including only observations after privatization, which does not change our 
findings. Detailed results are available upon request.  
4 The debtors are unlikely to default if credits are already nearly repaid. The inclusion of those firms 
could bias the results.  
5 Unfortunately, the lack of data on fixed assets as a proxy for collateral restricts our analysis in this 
respect.  
5 million) and SKK 300 million (approximately EUR 10 million). The same nominal 
interval was applied during the whole available period, while the average inflation was 
about 8 per cent annually. However, the majority of the reported entities have total sales 
in the lower range of the spectrum. 
Following the general practice of the financial institutions, we define defaults if a 
loan is written off, or after the delay in repayment exceeds 90 days, or a client is 
classified by the bank as substandard, doubtful or loss-making during the observed 
period. With a few exceptions, the bank terminated the relationships with defaulting 
companies after either eventual repayment of the obligations or the company became 
bankrupt. We do not have any data for recoveries of defaulting companies, which are 
supervised by a specialized unit of the bank.  
Insert Figure 1 about here  
For Slovakia, the volume of credits to private domestic non-financial corporations 
grew by 1.7 per cent, on average, between 2001 and 2005 (see NBS, 2006). Thus, the 
share of domestic corporate loans to GDP declined to 7.6 per cent in 2004 (see Figure 
1). More recently, however, the total volume of corporate loans expanded by 23 per cent 
and 34 per cent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Figure 2 shows the development of 
loans granted and defaults for our dataset, during the period analyzed. We can see only 
a slightly higher default rate between January 2002 and June 2003, which corresponded 
to the business cycle in Slovakia. Similarly, we can see a moderate expansion of credits 
to the SMEs in 2004 and 2005. This development pattern approximately follows the 
development of credits granted in Slovakia (see Figure 1).  
Insert Figure 2 about here  
For the whole period, we have 1496 observations available for 667 SMEs. Of this 
number, 90 SMEs (6.0 per cent of observations) defaulted on their loan during the 
observation period. The share of default loans in total loans is nearly the same (also 6.0 
per cent of total loans). Among all Slovak banks, the average share of non-performing 
6 loans
6 in total assets decreased from 24.3 per cent in 2000 to 7.2 per cent in 2004 
(EBRD, 2005a). Thus, the quality of the bank’s portfolio is above average.  
In an international comparison, the default rates we observe in our analysis are 
(slightly) above reported figures. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and Jacobson et al. 
(2005) report a default rate of 2.7 per cent for SMEs in the US and of default rates 
between 0.9 and 2.3 per cent for Swedish SMEs. Moreover, Altman and Suggitt (2000) 
report average default probabilities for a five year period (measured by a similar 
indicator based on the number of issuers) of about 4.5 per cent for loans to companies 
with an original S&P rating B and 23 per cent for companies with rating Caa.
7 Slightly 
more evidence is available on the default recovery rates of loans that range between 
mean values of 65 and 87 per cent in developed countries, depending on the data set 
(Carty and Lieberman, 1998; Asarnow and Edwards, 1995; Grossman et al., 1997).  
Insert Table 1 about here  
In each year, we have about 300 observations. However, there are only few SMEs 
with a longer history at the bank. Moreover, we do not have any information about them 
before and after the credit window. This is also true if the SMEs had had earlier credits 
provided by the bank analyzed. As a result, the average reported duration of the lending 
relationship between the SME and the bank in the last available period (January 2004-
June 2005) is 2.6 years. This is largely comparable to an average loan length of 29 
months as reported by EBRD (2005b). Only 66 SMEs had received loans from the bank 
continuously during the whole period. There are also few SMEs with credit 
relationships in only a few selected years of the whole period.  
Our data sample does not include companies without bank loans.
8 Nevertheless, the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the share of credits is relatively small on 
average (15 per cent of total liabilities). In turn, we have SMEs from those with nearly 
                                                 
6 According to Jurča and Zeman (2008), a significant part of non-performing loans was already removed 
from the banking sector at the beginning of 2001.  
7 A broad comparison with the firms analyzed in this contribution may be given by the S&P rating of the 
long-run bank activities, which is BB. The SMEs (with no ranking available) instead could represent a 
rather more risky activity of the bank, which is then comparable with the latter firm group analyzed by 
Altman and Suggitt (2000).  
8 According to EBRD (2005b), approximately 56 per cent of Slovak SMEs had no loans in 2005.  
7 zero loans up to those with 85 per cent of total liabilities. This indicates that the 
selection bias should not play an overwhelmingly important role in our data set. Also 
other papers show that the selection bias is not severe. Using data on both firms with 
and without loans, Chakraborty and Hu (2006) show that the selection bias is not severe 
when estimating whether a loan is collateralized or not. A similar result is found by 
Fungáčová (2007a and 2007b) for delisting the shares of companies on the stock 
exchanges in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the dummies for years, 
industries and legal forms are likely to reduce selection bias as well (see Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002). We also estimate sector-specific and time-varying effects to see whether 
the effects remain statistically robust, as selection bias is likely to be different between 
sectors and time periods.  
Table 1 shows that there is only weak statistical evidence that the size of the 
defaulting SMEs is larger than that of the whole data sample.
9 In particular, the F-test, 
for the equality of means of sales of defaulting and non-defaulting companies, can be 
rejected only at a 10% significance level, while variances in the sub-samples are not 
significantly different. In Table 1 we can see that the mean and variance of the selected 
financial ratios (earnings before taxation as well as cash and bank accounts as shares of 
total assets) between the sub-samples of default and non-default SMEs are significantly 
different. By contrast, there is only weak evidence that the mean and variance of bank 
loans are significantly different between the two sub-samples.  
4.  Factors Influencing the Probability of Default 
4.1 Default Factors  
We estimate several specifications of probit models for loan defaults of SMEs in 
Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005 (that is, for five partially overlapping 
periods). Our dependent variable is the conditional probability at time t, given the 
available information set on the firm i time t – 1, Ω, that the firm defaults on its loan,  
  ( )
t i t i t i t i t i t t i P L C q P
, , 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 1 , | 1 ε γ β β β β + + + + + = Ω =
− − − − Z ,   (1) 
                                                 
9 Klapper et al. (2006) show that by using balance sheet data for the years between 1998 and 2002 smaller 
SMEs in Poland tend to be more liquid.  
8 where  C,  L, and P denote financial ratios on firms’ indebtedness, liquidity and 
profitability, and Z is a vector of additional control variables (industry, time and legal 
form dummies). We do not include any explanatory variables that characterize the bank 
structure, because all loans are reported by a single bank. However, we include time 
effects in selected specifications, which may also reflect the business cycle and bank-
specific developments. Note that all explanatory variables are lagged, hence we 
consider them to be exogenous.  
Equation (1) includes factors mentioned in the rich literature on default probability 
estimations (see Chan-Lau, 2006), credit scoring models (see Rona-Tas, 2008, Mester, 
1997, and Kočenda and Vojtek, 2006 and 2009), and enterprise restructuring in 
transition economies (see Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Bris et al. (2006) estimate a 
similar logit model of default recoveries in the US. Furthermore, the control variables 
follow the traditional literature on financial ratios and bankruptcies reviewed by Altman 
(1968) and Beaver (1966). However, our model concentrates on fewer variables than 
credit scoring models (see Mester, 1997, Berger et al., 2005) because we include only 
robust variables that can also be easily interpreted.
10  
Insert Table 2 about here  
From the point of view of the discussion on financial ratios in the earlier literature 
(see Altman, 1968, Altman and Suggitt, 2000), bank loans as a share of total liabilities 
represent the debt factors of financial distress. Both the theoretical literature on agency 
problems and the empirical literature on the determinants of corporate bankruptcy (as 
formulated in hypothesis 1 in section 2) suggest that more highly indebted firms are 
more likely to default. 
If banks have efficient credit evaluation tools for excluding the excessively risky 
firms in advance, and sufficient control or monitoring mechanisms over the activities of 
the SMEs during the duration of the loans, we would expect the influence of bank loans 
on defaults to be largely insignificant. By contrast, we find adverse and significant 
effects of bank loans (see specification P1 in Table 2) indicating that the creditor cannot 
fully enforce his controlling role. This effect is robust to the inclusion of time and 
                                                 
10 Estimation results for a broader set of explanatory variables are available upon request from the 
authors.  
9 industry dummies, as well as the dummies indicating the legal form of the SMEs (see 
specification P2).  
The positive coefficient may largely reflect the higher default probabilities of highly 
indebted SMEs (debt channel), while the banks still own relatively efficient tools for 
assessing the a priori risk.
11 Because our explanatory variables are lagged by one year, 
we consider them as exogenous and use bank loans as a criterion for sample splitting. In 
particular, we include only SMEs with lagged loans above the median level of loans 
(that is, approximately 12 per cent of current short-term liabilities). Indeed, we find a 
highly positive and significant coefficient (see specification P3) for this subsample.
12  
In our estimation, we control for other determinants of corporate defaults. We 
expect that firms are more likely to default if they face liquidity problems and low 
profitability (hypothesis 2). Based on the existing literature on bankruptcy and 
regression analysis including a broader set of variables, we selected two further 
variables, which are crucially important for the financial wealth of the firms. First, the 
SMEs that have relatively higher cash amounts and finance available in their bank 
accounts (relative to total assets) are significantly less likely to default on their loans in 
the next 18 months than the rest of the sample (see Table 2). This variable reflects the 
liquidity and solvency channels. Second, companies that have high earnings before 
taxation (as a share of total assets) are also less likely to default on their loan in the 
following reporting period than the average of the sample. This channel indicates the 
profitability of the SMEs stressed in the earlier literature.  
In our further sensitivity analysis (not reported here), we controlled for possible 
nonlinearities. The quadratic terms were insignificant for all explanatory variables. 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, we cannot include information on collateral, which is not available in the data set. 
Possibly collateral and interest rates are high enough to guarantee profitability  in the presence of higher 
risk firms too. We also computed the implicit loan-specific interest rate similarly to Fidrmuc et al. (2009) 
from the available indicators, which was insignificant.  
12 By contrast, bank loans are insignificant in the sub-sample with firms with indebtedness below the 
median level. Detailed results are available upon request.  
10 Furthermore, the link test for model specification (see Pregibon, 1980) also reveals no 
problems with the specification of our estimations (see Table 2).
13  
 
4.2 Default Factors by Sectors  
Default probabilities may differ largely between the sectors for a variety of reasons. 
First, capital intensity is highly different for the individual sectors. More capital 
intensive sectors are more dependent on external capital. At the same time, the nature of 
business and the available collateral are different for specific branches. Therefore, we 
estimate the default equation (1) with all coefficients being specified for the individual 
sector,  
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Moreover, an estimation of equation (2) may provide hints on possible selection bias 
of our estimations. In particular, our data set only includes firms which passed the initial 
criteria for credits. It is likely that those criteria have different effects on different 
sectors.  
Table 3 shows robustness of our results especially with respect to profitability and 
liquidity. These variables are significant for all one-digit sectors. In contrast, bank loans 
are robust only for agriculture and services. Highly indebted firms are also likely to 
default in industry. Somewhat surprisingly, debt has no significant relationship on 
default probabilities in the construction sector. The effect of this variable is possibly 
even negative if we consider also the legal form effects. This can be explained by the 
real estate boom in Slovakia in the analyzed period, which had positive effects on this 
sector in general. For all explanatory variables, the test of coefficient equality confirms 
that the effects are clearly different between the sectors. The joint test confirms that the 
effects are significantly different from zero for all variables (not reported in Table 3).  
 
                                                 
13 The link test is based on the regression of the left hand variable (default probabilities in our case) on the 
fitted values from the tested regression as well as the squares of those values. The values squared should 
not be significant if the model is specified correctly. This is confirmed by the reported link test statistics 
in Table 2.  
11 4.3 Time Varying Default Factors  
Next, we analyze the stability of the relationships between default probabilities and our 
explanatory variables. We can see that there was actually a structural change, especially 
with respect to bank loans. In particular, we test whether coefficients in equation (1) are 
stable for the individual time periods. The test on coefficient equality confirms that 
profitability and liquidity are not statistically different during the sample period, but the 
null of equal coefficients in five available periods was rejected for bank loans.  
Table 4 shows that there is convergence to the expected relationship between 
defaults and bank loans, which possibly started in the second year of our sample. Thus, 
during the period analyzed, the influence of bank loans on the probability of default in 
Slovakia has become similar to what we observe in other industrialized countries. 
Given the changes in the institutional and macroeconomic environment, we can see 
two potential explanations for the convergence of default factors to what we know from 
the literature. First, the bad loans of the bank were transferred to specialized 
consolidation institutions in two steps in 1999 and 2000 (see Tkáčová, 2001). Second, 
the privatization of the bank was completed in 2001. Both the burden of a huge stock of 
bad loans and state ownership distorted incentives of banks and thereby caused big 
inefficiencies in the financial sector. Privatization and the transfer of bad loans 
improved incentives for prudent lending; the entry of foreign banks contributed to the 
emergence of standard procedures for credit evaluation in Slovakia. Similar effects are 
found in other transition economies (Bonin et al., 2005).  
 
4.4 Panel Estimation 
As another sensitivity check, we include random effects for the individual SMEs in (1), 
although we have to keep in mind that we have an unbalanced panel with a relatively 
short time dimension.
14 Nevertheless, firm-specific effects cover all unobservable 
characteristics of the SMEs, and thus, also reduce the possible selection bias (see 
                                                 
14 We cannot use fixed effect probit or conditional logit estimators because fixed effects are perfect 
predictors of non-defaults. Furthermore, fixed effect estimators of nonlinear panel models can be severely 
biased due to the so called incidental parameters problem (see Fernández-Val, 2009).  
12 Djankov and Murrel, 2002). Actually, the coefficient for bank loans is no longer 
significant in the basic specifications (see REP1 and REP2 in Table 5), although it 
retains the positive sign, while all other determinants of defaults remain unchanged.  
It seems that unobservable firm-specific factors to a large extent explain the 
relationship between bank loans and defaults of the SMEs. However, default rates of 
highly indebted firms are still positively related to bank loans when we include firm-
specific effects (specification REP3). Thus, it seems that high indebtedness is of crucial 
importance for defaults. This result is consistent with the agency theory that incentives 
deteriorate in more highly indebted firms.  
Insert Table 5 about here  
5.  Incentive Structure and the Effects of Legal Forms 
Various specifications of (1) also involve dummies for sectoral and legal form effects, 
which can provide further insights to factors of defaults of SMEs with focus on 
incentive structure. In particular, we include sectoral effects to selected specifications of 
(1) in order to cover for possible differences between the economic sectors. On the one 
hand, such differences can be driven by the different nature of the business and 
collateral. On the other hand, a bank may specialize in particular sectors. In fact, one 
third of the credit cases is given to the SMEs active in the industrial sector, while de la 
Rocha (2001) reports that about 15 per cent of firms are registered in industry. The 
difference is even larger for agriculture, which received about one quarter of all credits 
analyzed here, although it represents less than six per cent of Slovak firms according to 
de la Rocha (2001). A possible explanation of this structure is that collateral is 
particularly high in the agricultural sector. In turn, retail trade and other services might 
receive less credit than their share in the economy (three quarters of all registered firms 
against about one third of the credits). However, those differences can also be caused by 
the higher need for the external financial funds in sectors with high fixed assets.  
Figure 3 shows the estimated sectoral effects for the one-digit NACE industries 
according to selected specifications (see Table 2, columns P2, P3, and Table 3, columns 
REP2 and REP3) of (1). Industrial SMEs, as the largest category, were selected as the 
base sector for comparisons. For our base probit specification (see column P2 in Table 
2), the estimated effects confirm approximately equal default probabilities between the 
13 sectors. Nevertheless, retail trade seems to be more secure than industry, while we find 
higher sectoral default probabilities for agriculture, construction, and other services.  
However, the picture changes if we consider only highly indebted firms. Figure 3 
shows that highly indebted SMEs in agriculture have much higher default probabilities 
than in any other sectors in Slovakia. This adverse effect in agriculture is also confirmed 
by panel probit estimation for the highly indebted firms. In turn, the estimated effects 
for the remaining sectors also remain stable for different credit size and panel 
estimations.  
Insert Figure 3 about here  
For legal entities, a minimum endowment with equity is mandatory, but only at a 
relatively low level. In contrast, natural persons are fully liable and may lose all their 
personal assets if they fail. Choosing to operate a business as a legal entity may, 
therefore, be a deliberate choice by an entrepreneur to limit its liability. Liability, 
however, has important effects on incentives. Therefore, we expect that natural persons 
are less likely to default than legal bodies (hypothesis 3). 
Descriptive analysis indicates that the legal form determines the liability of a debtor. 
Limited liability companies (denoted by s.r.o.) represent over half of the sample. Their 
default probabilities, of approximately 5.4 per cent, are slightly below the average. The 
joint stock companies (denoted by a.s.) and cooperatives represent 24 per cent and 20 
per cent of the sample, with default probabilities of approximately 7 per cent in both 
categories. Our data sample also involves 66 loans to private businesses of natural 
persons with only one single default (1.5 per cent). Finally, we have three loan cases of 
small state enterprises with no defaults.  
The effects estimated for legal forms (see Figure 4) confirm that natural persons are 
much less likely to default than other legal forms. However, the number (66 natural 
persons, of whom one defaulted) is possibly too low to draw final conclusions. The 
limited liability companies (s.r.o.) are only slightly less risky than the joint stock 
companies (a.s.), according to our base probit specification. For large credits, however, 
the risk for the limited liability companies increases more than for the joint stock 
companies. The same behavior can be seen for panel probit for large credits.  
This may reflect the different legal standards of these types of companies. The 
limited liability companies can be founded with a low amount of starting capital (only 
14 SKK 200,000 which is approximately EUR 5,000 or about 75 percent of annual GDP/ 
capita in 2005). Unlike the joint stock companies, the limited liability companies are not 
obliged to provide any public reports for their business activity. There is anecdotal 
evidence that, among SMEs, limited liability companies are less confident business 
partners than any other types of business, and this is confirmed by our results. 
Insert Figure 4 about here  
6.  Conclusions  
The emerging markets seem particularly prone to financial crises. They are hit strongly 
by the current financial crisis and were previously subject to crises, such as the Asian 
crisis. Does the relatively frequent occurrence of crisis imply that the credit business is 
particularly risky in these countries? We analyze this question for loans granted by one 
bank in Slovakia during the period 2000 and 2005. This period is very well suited for 
the analysis because loan growth was moderate and did not show the extremely high 
growth rates of the following years. Actually, the literature suggests that banking crises 
are preceded by financial liberalization (Kaminsky and Reinhard, 1999) and high rates 
of loan growth (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997). In the case of the current crisis, however, 
it is not as clear how much rapid loan growth contributed to the emergence of the crisis. 
It seems that the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis has immediate 
contagion effects also in Eastern Europe.  
During the period 2000 to 2005, on average about 6.0 per cent of the SMEs 
defaulted on their loans. We find that the level of defaults was somewhat higher than the 
default rates found for SMEs in Sweden and in the US. However, the higher margins 
earned by banks in Slovakia should compensate banks for bearing more risk. The 
default factors (high indebtedness as well as low profitability and liquidity) are very 
similar to those of developed financial markets. Therefore, these factors can also be 
used to carefully evaluate potential risks of outstanding credits in Slovakia.  
With respect to the role of incentives, our results confirm that businesses of natural 
persons are much less likely to default than legal entities with restricted liability of their 
owners. This is consistent with the effects of full personal liability, which provides 
proper incentives to debtors. We also find important differences between sectors, legal 
forms and credit size. 
15 The level of indebtedness indicates one important source of risk in the expansion of 
credits to the SMEs. Thus, attempts (for instance, by foreign banks) to gain market 
shares may come at the cost of a higher risk. This might be the case especially if loan 
growth is achieved mainly by larger credits to both new and incumbent customers. 
Currently, however, the most important source of risk is a long-term negative impact of 
the financial crisis on profitability and liquidity of the borrowing firms.  
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Source: National Bank of Slovakia, own calculations (current prices).  
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Cash and bank 
accounts
A: Non-default companies   
Mean 100319 0.152 0.033  0.298
Median 78046 0.117 0.019  0.146
Max 298431 0.853 0.488  27.727
Min. 30115 - -0.321  -
Std. Dev.  65584 0.125 0.078  0.832
B: Default companies        
Mean 114200 0.177 -0.038  0.100
Median 89271 0.118 -0.001  0.054
Max 291358 0.666 0.171  0.715
Min. 30142 0.006 -0.617  -
Std. Dev.  71465 0.147 0.119  0.138
C: F-Test of equal mean and 











  [0.300] [0.052] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: All indicators are defined as a share of total liabilities/assets. p-values are reported in brackets. *, 






























































Notes: All indicators are defined as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level of 
indebtedness included firms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coefficients 
report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. 
z-statistics computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries are 
reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
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Notes: All indicators are defined as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level of 
indebtedness included firms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coefficients 
report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. z-
statistics computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
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Notes: All indicators are defined as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level of 
indebtedness included firms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coefficients 
report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. z-
statistics computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries are in 




Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis, Panel Probit, January 2000 – June 2005 
 REP1  REP2  REP3   
Bank loans  0.791  1.471
* 2.948 
**
 (1.28)  (1.82)  (2.22)   




 (-5.08)  (-4.90)  (-2.36)   




 (-3.89)  (-3.81)  (-2.38)   
Industry, time and legal form dummies   No  Yes  Yes   
Indebtedness level  All  All  High   
Number of observations  1496  1496  748   
Log-likelihood   -284.825  -268.014  -140.546   
Notes: All indicators are defined as a share of total liabilities/assets. The coefficients report changes in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. The sample with the high 
level of indebtedness included firms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
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Agriculture Construction Retail trade Other services
Probit Highly Indebted Firms Panel-Probit Panel Probit for Highly Indebted Firms
 
Note: See Table 2, specifications P2, P3, and Table 5 REP2 and REP3 for details on the other explanatory 
variables. Industry is selected as the reference category. The figure reports changes in the probability for a 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. 
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Natural persons Limited liability company (s.r.o.) Joint stock company (a.s.)
Probit Highly Indebted Firms Panel-Probit Panel Probit for Highly Indebted Firms
 
Note: See Table 2, specifications P2, P3, and Table 5 REP2 and REP3 for details on the other explanatory 
variables. State enterprises and cooperatives are selected as the reference category. The figure reports 
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